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 Carl Schmitt and the analogy between 
constitutional and international law: Are 
constitutional and international law inherently 
political? 
 l  a  r  s   v  i  n  x  
 Department of Philosophy ,  Bilkent University ,  06800 Ankara ,  Turkey 
 Email:  vinx@bilkent.edu.tr 
 Abstract :  According to Carl Schmitt, constitutional law and international law 
are analogous in that they are both forms of political law. Schmitt concludes 
that neither is open to legitimate judicial enforcement. This paper critically 
explores Schmitt’s analogy between constitutional and international law. It argues 
that the analogy can be turned against Schmitt and contemporary sceptics about 
international law: Since we no longer have any reason to deny the judicial 
enforceability of domestic constitutional law, the analogy now suggests that there 
is no reason to think that legitimate judicial enforcement of international law is 
impossible. 
 Keywords :  Carl Schmitt ;  constitutionalism ;  international law ;  judicial 
review ;  legitimacy 
 Introduction 
 Critics of legalism in international affairs frequently base their 
arguments on an alleged contrast between domestic and international 
legality: International law is said to lack most of the features that make 
a domestic legal system an efﬁ cient and legitimate instrument of 
governance. International law is weakly institutionalized; international 
adjudication is fragmented and non-compulsory; enforcement of 
international law is weak; and the mechanisms for changing the law 
cumbersome as well as lacking in democratic legitimacy. Consequently, 
sceptics argue, international law works only if there is a local 
convergence of interest on the part of sovereign states. The attempt to 
fully subject international politics to the rule of law cannot succeed, at 
least in the absence of a world-state that is universally judged to be 
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undesirable. Lawyers and politicians should therefore be mindful of the 
narrow limits of international law. 1 
 The aim of this paper is to offer a critique of scepticism about international 
legality. To be more precise, the paper will question the assumption that 
domestic and international legality are profoundly different in character. 
At the level of constitutional law the potential problems of legitimacy of 
the domestic rule of law are perfectly analogous to the problems that 
allegedly plague the rule of international law. It is therefore wrong to think 
that the goal of creating and maintaining a legitimate international rule of 
law raises special challenges; challenges that are fundamentally different 
from the challenges that must be overcome to establish the domestic rule 
of constitutional law. 2 
 To support this claim, the paper will reconsider Carl Schmitt’s analysis 
of the limits of legitimate constitutional and international adjudication. 
Schmitt, like modern sceptics about the rule of international law, was 
wary of the project of subjecting international politics to the control of 
international courts. 3 But he likewise rejected the institution of domestic 
constitutional review and thus the idea that domestic politics is capable of 
full legalization. According to Schmitt, there is no deep qualitative difference 
between domestic constitutional legality and international legality. Rather, 
in Schmitt’s view, the legitimacy problems of the rule of international law 
closely resemble those of the rule of domestic constitutional law. The ideal 
of full legalization, and in particular the aim of making the law fully 
enforceable by judicial institutions, against the will of the sovereigns, is 
therefore to be rejected in both spheres. 
 1  See  EA  Posner ,  The Perils of Global Legalism ( University of Chicago Press ,  Chicago , 
 2009 ) ;  JL  Goldsmith and  EA  Posner ,  The Limits of International Law ( Oxford University 
Press ,  New York ,  2005 ) . Posner’s scepticism about international legality echoes the Austinian 
view that legality, to be effective, requires enforcement by a sovereign power, and that 
international law must therefore fail to be more than a form of ‘positive morality’. See  J  Austin , 
 The Province of Jurisprudence Determined , edited by  WE  Rumble ( Cambridge University 
Press ,  Cambridge ,  1995 )  123 –5 , 171. Some authors instead accentuate the normative claim 
that subjection to international law would be incompatible with popular sovereignty. See 
 PW  Kahn ,  Political Theology. Four New Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty ( Columbia 
University Press ,  New York ,  2011 )  31 – 90 ;  JA  Rabkin ,  Law Without Nations? Why Constitutional 
Government Requires Sovereign States ( Princeton University Press ,  Princeton ,  2007 ) ; 
 J  Rubenfeld , ‘ Unilateralism and Constitutionalism ’ ( 2004 )  79  New York University Law Review 
 1971 – 2028 . 
 2  See also  J  Goldsmith and  D  Levinson , ‘ Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law ’ ( 2009 )  122  Harvard Law Review  1791 –868. 
 3  Schmitt was one of the intellectual precursors of modern ‘realism’ in international 
relations theory. See  WE  Scheuerman ,  Carl Schmitt: The End of Law ( Rowman & Littleﬁ eld , 
 Lanham, MD ,  1999 )  225 –51. 
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 The relevance of this claim to contemporary debate should be obvious. 
If there is indeed an analogy between domestic constitutional law and 
international law, sceptics about the future prospects of international legality 
cannot support their view by arguing that domestic and international 
legality are profoundly different, that international legality is afﬂ icted by 
problems of legitimacy or enforceability that do not apply to the domestic 
context. And if there is good reason to believe,  pace Schmitt, that domestic 
constitutionalism, understood to include the full judicial enforceability 
of constitutional norms, is a viable project, we might be able to turn the 
analogy of constitutional and international law against the modern sceptic. 
A consistent sceptic about international legality must be willing to own up 
to the view that the limits of international legality are simply an instance 
of the limits of legality in all its forms, and that there are equally narrow 
limits of domestic constitutional legality. He must claim, in other words, 
that domestic constitutional law, in situations characterized by political 
conﬂ ict and disagreement, is as unenforceable by courts as international 
law. But this position, I will argue, is implausible. 4 Its contemporary 
defenders do little more than to reproduce Schmitt’s account of the limits 
of legitimate legality, an account that I will show to be mistaken. 
 Schmitt’s denial of the justiciability of domestic conﬂ ict 
 Carl Schmitt frequently claimed that both constitutional and international 
law are forms of political law and consequently cannot be applied or 
guaranteed, at least not fully, by courts. 5 According to Schmitt, both 
constitutional and international law rest on the presupposition of a 
situation of normality that can only be brought about and guaranteed by 
purely political action. 6 This view implies that the law and legal institutions 
 4  This use of the analogy is inspired by the discussion of the limits of legality in 
 H  Lauterpacht ,  The Function of Law in the International Community ( Clarendon Press , 
 Oxford ,  1933 )  385 – 438 . 
 5  For example  C  Schmitt , ‘ Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus ’ in 
 C  Schmitt ,  Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar – Genf – Versailles 1923–1939 
( Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  1988 )  190 : ‘International law, just like constitutional law, is 
unavoidably political law.’ 
 6  C  Schmitt ,  Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty , translated 
by  G  Schwab ( University of Chicago Press ,  Chicago ,  2005 )  13 : ‘Every general norm demands 
a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is subjected to 
its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium. This effective normal situation is 
not a mere “superﬁ cial presupposition” that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely 
to its immanent validity. There exists no norm that is applicable to a chaos. For a legal order 
to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who deﬁ nitely decides whether 
this normal situation exists.’ 
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are powerless actively to promote order, peace, and justice or to make a 
positive contribution to the solution of social or intercommunal conﬂ ict. 
The rule of law can gain a foothold only where all non-trivial conﬂ icts 
have already been overcome in some other way. 
 Schmitt, to be sure, did not put forward the implausible claim that it is 
literally impossible for a constitutional legislator or for members of the 
international community to create judicial institutions formally tasked 
with applying international or constitutional law. Schmitt’s point, rather, 
is the more subtle one that such juridiﬁ cation could not possibly be 
 legitimate ; at least not if there are profound disagreements, among social 
groups or members of international society, as to how the constitutional 
or international law that is to be applied is to be understood. Far from 
realizing the ideal of the rule of law, any full juridiﬁ cation of constitutional 
or international law will inevitably undermine the separation of law and 
politics and lead to politically unaccountable ‘indirect rule’ under a veil 
of legality. 7 
 The following quotation from  The Guardian of the Constitution , a 
work in which Schmitt, in response to Hans Kelsen’s call for the creation 
of a constitutional court in Weimar Germany, 8 attacked the legitimacy of 
constitutional review, contains a characteristic expression of this line of 
thought: 
 It seems plausible to regard the judicial settlement of all political 
questions as an ideal of the rule of law. But this would be to overlook 
that an extension of adjudication to matters that are perhaps no longer 
justiciable can only harm the reputation of the courts. As I have often 
shown, both for constitutional as well as for international law, the 
consequence of such an extension would not be a juridiﬁ cation of politics 
but rather a politicization of adjudication. 9 
 The demand for an ‘adjudicative settlement of all political questions’, 
Schmitt argues, results from a ‘misunderstood and abstract conception of 
the rule of law’ and should therefore be rejected. 10 
 Schmitt repeats this assessment in a number of other key works, 
throughout the course of his whole career. It would therefore be wrong 
 7  See for Schmitt’s concept of indirect rule  C  Schmitt ,  The Leviathan in the State Theory of 
Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and Failure of a Political Symbol , translated by  G  Schwab 
( University of Chicago Press ,  Chicago ,  2008 )  65 – 78 . 
 8  H  Kelsen , ‘ Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit ’ in  H  Klecatsky ,  R  Marci ć 
and  H  Schambeck (eds),  Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule. Ausgewählte Schriften von 
Hans Kelsen, Adolf Julius Merkl und Alfred Verdross , vol  II ( Europa Verlag ,  Vienna ,  1968 ) 
 1813 –72. 
 9  C  Schmitt ,  Der Hüter der Verfassung ( Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  1931 )  22 . 
 10  Ibid, 22. 
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to suppose that the passage quoted above is unrepresentative of Schmitt’s 
general constitutional theory. The deep hostility towards constitutional 
review is clearly a  leitmotif of Schmitt’s work as a constitutional 
theorist. 11 What is more, it found practical expression when Schmitt 
became involved in the most important case of constitutional 
adjudication that took place in the Weimar Republic; the decision 
of the Weimar  Staatsgerichtshof on the legality of the so-called 
‘ Preussenschlag ’. 
 On 20 July 1932, the conservative federal government led by Franz von 
Papen, authorized by an emergency decree signed by president Hindenburg, 
deposed the social-democratic government of the state of Prussia and 
appointed federal commissioners to bring the powers of the Prussian 
government under the control of the central government. The emergency 
decree authorizing the measure appealed to Article 48 of the Weimar 
constitution, which gave the president the power to force states to fulﬁ l 
their constitutional duties towards the  Reich with the use of armed force, 
and to take all measures necessary to restore public safety and order. The 
Prussian government denied that it had violated any constitutional duties 
or that it was unable to secure public order in Prussia, and asked the 
 Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig, a tribunal empowered by Article 19 of the 
Weimar Constitution to hear cases concerning conﬂ icts between the federal 
government and the individual states, to issue an injunction against the 
 Preussenschlag . While the court refused to issue such an injunction, it did 
initiate a full trial, to determine whether the  Preussenschlag had been 
constitutional or not. 12 
 11  Schmitt expressed strong reservations concerning constitutional review in his 1928 
 Verfassungslehre . See  C  Schmitt ,  Constitutional Theory , translated and edited by  Jeffrey  Seitzer 
( Duke University Press ,  Durham and London ,  2008 )  163 –4 . In 1929, Schmitt criticized the 
Weimar  Reichsgericht for calling itself a guardian of the constitution and for claiming the 
power to exercise a limited form of judicial review. See  C  Schmitt , ‘ Das Reichsgericht als Hüter 
der Verfassung ’ in  C  Schmitt ,  Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–1954. 
Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre ( Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  1958 )  63 – 100 . When this 
paper was reprinted in 1958, Schmitt added a comment attacking the  Bundesverfassungsgericht 
for not being deferential enough to the legislator (ibid, 105–9). In 1967, Schmitt went so far as 
to compare the judicial enforcement of substantive constitutional values in postwar West 
Germany to the eliminative violence of the Nazis. See  C  Schmitt ,  Die Tyrannei der Werte 
( 3rd edn ,  Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  2011 )  51 –5 . For a more complete list of Schmitt’s 
attacks on judicial review see  H  Hofmann ,  Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der polischen 
Philosophie Carl Schmitts ( 4th edn ,  Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  2002 )  33 , fn 165. 
 12  See for a short overview  H  Mommsen ,  Aufstieg und Untergang der Republik von 
Weimar ( Ullstein ,  Berlin ,  2009 )  536 –48 . For discussion of the constitutional issue and the 
decision of the Staatsgerichtshof see  D  Dyzenhaus ,  Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, 
Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar ( Oxford University Press ,  Oxford ,  1997 )  28 – 37 . 
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 Schmitt was appointed as one of the  Reich’s legal representatives in 
Leipzig and was centrally involved in preparing the government’s 
defence. 13 Schmitt’s line of argument focused on the question whether the 
 Staatsgerichtshof was in a position to second-guess the president’s 
judgment that public order and security in Prussia were threatened so that 
a federal intervention had become necessary. In his closing statement in 
court, Schmitt admitted that the  Staatsgerichtshof could be called a ‘guardian 
of the constitution’. But he emphasized that the court’s guardianship ought 
to be limited to questions properly subject to judicial decision. To decide 
whether a threat to public order and security requires the use of dictatorial 
powers, in Schmitt’s view, is a political question, and thus not for courts 
to decide. Hence, the president’s use of Article 48 ought to be regarded as 
the exercise of a speciﬁ cally political guardianship of the constitution not 
subject to the scrutiny of the courts. Since the dictatorial powers of the 
president under Article 48 in Schmitt’s view undoubtedly included the 
power to suspend the government of a state if necessary, he suggested that 
the court should not have let the case come to trial, for the reason that the 
commissioners appointed by the federal government ought to have been 
recognized as the authentic representatives of the state of Prussia. 14 
 This argument did not fully win out. The court upheld the legality of a 
temporary assumption of the executive powers of the Prussian government 
by the Reich, on the ground that public order and security had indeed been 
threatened in Prussia. But the court rejected the claim that the Prussian 
government had violated its constitutional duties towards the  Reich and 
held that the Prussian government could not be stripped, under Article 48, 
of its power to represent the state of Prussia in the  Reichsrat , i.e. in the 
federal process of legislation. This compromise failed to satisfy Schmitt 
as well as other prominent legal observers, and it did little to stabilize the 
Weimar Republic in the face of its national-socialist enemies. While the 
decision put the actions of the president under a cloud of legal suspicion, 
it did nothing to practically reverse the conservative coup d’état in 
Germany’s largest and most important state. 
 However, the diagnoses as to why the court had botched the case 
differed widely. Hans Kelsen argued that the court should not be held 
responsible for its hesitant and unsatisfactory decision. The root of the 
problem, as Kelsen saw it, was the defective character of the constitution 
itself, which had failed to create a robust framework of constitutional 
 13  G  Seiberth ,  Anwalt des Reiches. Carl Schmitt und der Prozess ‘Preussen contra Reich’ 
vor dem Staatsgerichtshof ( Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  2001 ). 
 14  C Schmitt, ‘Schlußrede vor dem Staatsgerichtshof in Leipzig’ in Schmitt,  Positionen und 
Begriffe (n 5) 208–9. 
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review, and which had given the president far too unrestricted powers of 
emergency. These constitutional deﬁ ciencies, Kelsen argued, had been 
caused by the tendency of German jurisprudence to draw a sharp distinction 
between legal and political questions, in order to exempt the latter from 
judicial control. 15 In Kelsen’s view, this distinction is meaningless, since 
most legal conﬂ icts in constitutional or international law clearly have a 
political dimension, while so-called ‘political conﬂ icts’ usually turn out to 
be amenable to legal arbitration if the parties to a dispute prefer such 
arbitration to the resort to violence or coercion. 16 The fathers of the 
constitution, then, ought to have created a court with stronger powers of 
review, instead of clinging to the authoritarian ﬁ ction that the nature of 
political conﬂ ict inevitably renders a constitution partly unenforceable. 
 This was decidedly not Schmitt’s perspective, in whose view there had 
already been too much constitutional review. In a retrospective assessment 
of the causes of the downfall of the Weimar Republic published in 1935, 
Schmitt portrayed the trial in Leipzig as the culmination of a process of 
constitutional decay induced by liberal constitutional thought. 17 Liberal 
constitutionalism, in Schmitt’s view, abstracts from the substantive and 
pre-legal political identity of a people that can alone provide constitutional 
legitimacy and thus turns the constitution into a mere mechanism of 
positive legal rules that can no longer distinguish between friend and enemy. 
The attempt to subject the  Preussenschlag to judicial review, Schmitt 
argued, was the logical endpoint of the process of political neutralization 
inspired by liberal ideology and at the same time its  reductio ad absurdum . 
From the point of view of liberal constitutionalism, which demands that all 
exercises of political power be subject to legal control, the  Staatsgerichtshof 
was not in a position to refuse to pass judgment on the president’s actions 
under Article 48 of the Weimar constitution. But since a court’s legitimacy, 
in Schmitt’s opinion, inevitably rests on the claim that it merely applies the 
law, and does not take political decisions, the judges were not in a position 
to exercise political leadership and thus had to refuse a clear decision. The 
completion of the liberal demand for full judicial control of the state 
thus came to coincide with the end of any possibility of genuine political 
leadership that might have saved the crumbling constitution. Constitutional 
review, Schmitt mockingly concludes, is the crowning achievement of a 
 15  H  Kelsen , ‘ Das Urteil des Staatsgerichtshofs vom 25. Oktober 1932 ’ ( 1932 )  8  Die Justiz 
 65 – 91 . 
 16  Kelsen, ‘Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?’ in  Die Wiener rechtstheoretische Schule 
(n 8) 1882–4. 
 17  C  Schmitt ,  Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des zweiten Reiches. Der Sieg des Bürgers 
über den Soldaten , edited by  G  Maschke ( Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  2011 )  44 –7. 
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‘bourgeois constitutionalism that destroys any possibility of genuine 
government’. 18 
 Given this deep hostility to judicial review, it should not occasion 
surprise that Schmitt’s argument in  The Guardian of the Constitution is 
formulated in a thoroughly essentialist manner. Schmitt claims that some 
questions in constitutional or international law are political in their very 
nature and can never be a proper subject matter for adjudicative settlement. 
Moreover, Schmitt tells us that a political question cannot be turned into 
one that is properly subject to adjudicative settlement simply by endowing 
a court with the formal authority to decide it. To do so would leave the 
political nature of the question unaffected, and thus do nothing more than 
to undermine the separation of law and politics. 19 
 What, then, are the characteristics of political questions? And how do 
they explain the essential non-justiciability of such questions? The ﬁ rst 
place to look for an answer to this question, of course, is Schmitt’s analysis 
of the political in  The Concept of the Political . As is well known, Schmitt 
claims that political community is grounded in the distinction between 
friend and enemy. A political community is a social group of a very special 
kind. It is deﬁ ned not merely by a shared identity, but, additionally, by the 
willingness, on the part of the members of the group, to defend the group’s 
existence as a self-governing entity at the risk of their own life. In other 
words, a political community is a group – and, for every one of its individual 
members, the only group – that has the capacity to order its members to 
kill or to sacriﬁ ce their own lives in the group’s ﬁ ght against non-members. 
In successfully drawing a distinction between friend and enemy, a political 
community manifests its own existence, while at the same time deﬁ ning its 
membership. 20 
 Schmitt’s understanding of the political expresses the conviction that 
unrestricted self-determination is an essential feature of political community. 
A social group exists as a political community only as long as the group 
decides for itself who its enemies are. Hence, a group that submits to a 
friend–enemy distinction drawn by an external power, in exchange for a 
promise of protection or in reaction to a threat of force, forfeits its political 
existence. If its members are unwilling to continue to endorse a friend–
enemy distinction that is the group’s own, and to risk their life in the ﬁ ght 
 18  Ibid, 45. 
 19  Schmitt,  Der Hüter der Verfassung (n 9) 19, 22–48 and Schmitt, ‘Das Reichsgericht als 
Hüter der Verfassung’ (n 11) 73–89. 
 20  C  Schmitt ,  The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition , translated by  G  Schwab 
( University of Chicago Press ,  Chicago ,  2007 )  25 – 37 . 
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against those the group has declared to be enemies, the group will lose the 
status of political community. 21 
 A political question, accordingly, must be a question that concerns the 
very existence of a social group as a political community and thus raises the 
spectre of the friend–enemy distinction. This is a purely formal conception 
of what it means for a question to be political. As Schmitt himself is at pains 
to point out, the intensity of the political and the friend–enemy distinction 
can combine with very different markers of collective identity. Groups 
initially deﬁ ned in religious, economic, moral, or ethnic terms can all attain 
the status of political groups. It is therefore impossible, Schmitt argues, to 
offer a substantive criterion of the political. Any question can become 
political if a group judges it to concern its own political existence. 22 
 Schmitt’s understanding of the political in  The Concept of the Political 
explains why political questions are essentially non-justiciable. If political 
communities exist only in the mode of full self-determination, and if self-
determination is to be understood as a group’s capacity to draw a friend–
enemy distinction that is its own, and to decide for itself whether it is 
necessary, in a given case, to use force to defend its own existence, it will 
follow that political communities, to maintain their existence, must insist 
that political conﬂ icts cannot be subject to the compulsory arbitration of 
third parties. The judgment as to whether a conﬂ ict is political, and thus 
non-justiciable, can only be taken by the group itself as subjection to the 
judgment of third parties in this matter would forfeit political existence. 23 
In a truly political conﬂ ict between two hostile groups, the only available 
options for third parties are to either take sides or to avoid getting involved 
in the conﬂ ict at all. This rules out the possibility of legitimate judicial 
decision. A court called upon to decide a truly political conﬂ ict will either 
fail to be impartial or it will have to avoid a clear decision. 
 Note that this argument carries implications not just for international 
politics but also for the domestic constitutional sphere. A community, on 
pain of losing its own political existence, cannot alienate its power to draw 
a friend–enemy distinction to a written constitution, construed as a system 
of positive legal norms. 24 Schmitt clearly argues that a political community, 
 21  Ibid, 45–53. 
 22  Ibid, 37–45. 
 23  Ibid, 27: Political conﬂ icts ‘can neither be decided by a previously determined general 
norm nor by the judgment of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party’. Schwab’s 
translation omits scare quotes in the German original around ‘disinterested’ and ‘neutral’. 
Schmitt does not say that political conﬂ icts cannot be decided by third parties even if they are 
disinterested and neutral. He suggests, rather, that there are can be no neutral or disinterested 
parties in truly political conﬂ icts. 
 24  Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory (n 11) 140–6. 
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to maintain its existence, and to protect its identity, must have the capacity 
to declare members of society, and not just members of other political 
communities, to be enemies that should be denied the protection of the 
law. 25 A modern written constitution, in a liberal and democratic state, 
however, is obviously unlikely to make explicit allowance for that 
possibility. Rather, it will typically presume that all those who are legally 
recognized as citizens must be afforded the protection of the rule of law, 
regardless of whether they fully identify with the identity endorsed by the 
majority of the members of society. This demand, in turn, normally 
involves the further presumption that social conﬂ icts within society can 
and must be resolved through the proper employment of the constitution’s 
rules, whether in the legislative or the judicial process. 
 If a written constitution, on the basis of these presumptions, is taken to 
block the state from drawing a friend–enemy distinction to deal with a 
situation of internal crisis it will, from Schmitt’s point of view, become a 
danger to the existence of political community. The attempt to enforce the 
legalistic presumptions of liberal constitutionalism, by subjecting all 
internal disputes to the judgment of courts, amounts to an implicit denial 
of the political community’s power to protect the political expression of 
what it takes to be its identity as it sees ﬁ t. The existence of a sovereign 
power capable of taking a decision on the total exception, in the name of 
the political community, is therefore a necessary condition of a stable and 
legitimate legal order, Schmitt argued as early as 1922, even where such a 
power is not provided for by positive constitutional law. 26 
 It might be objected that this interpretation of Schmitt’s view of internal 
conﬂ ict is at odds with the constitutional theory put forward in  Constitutional 
Theory . Schmitt appears to adopt a constructive stance towards liberal 
constitutionalism in this key work, with a view to developing a conception 
of liberal constitutionalism mindful of the underlying conditions of the 
stability of liberal democracy. This impression, in my view, is misleading. 
 Schmitt’s argument in the  Constitutional Theory rests on a fundamental 
distinction between two different understandings of the constitution. 
According to what Schmitt calls the ‘relative concept of constitution’, the 
constitution is nothing but the set of legal norms that we can identify as 
constitutional laws, on the basis of their being protected by a special rule 
of amendment in the written constitution. Schmitt argues that this concept 
 25  Schmitt,  The Concept of the Political (n 20) 46–7. Schmitt had argued as early as 1921 
that the condition of normality upon which a liberal constitution must be created through 
exercises of sovereign dictatorship. See  C  Schmitt ,  Die Diktatur. Von den Anfängen des 
modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf ( 2nd edn ,  Duncker & 
Humblot ,  Berlin ,  1928 ). 
 26  Schmitt,  Political Theology (n 6). 
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of constitution is deeply implausible for two main reasons. To begin with, 
it is perverse to claim that the special status of constitutional norms is a 
result of the fact that they enjoy special procedural protection against 
legislative change. A plausible conception of constitution should argue the 
other way around, and invoke the substantive importance of constitutional 
laws to explain and justify their entrenchment. Moreover, to come to 
Schmitt’s second point, the relative concept of constitution abstracts from the 
constitutional relevance of constituent power as a source of constitutional 
legitimacy. The reason why the constitution can legitimately be treated as 
a higher law, in Schmitt’s view, is that the constitution is an expression of 
the constituent power of the people. The relative concept of constitution 
does not acknowledge this fact, and thus lacks the resources to justify 
constitutional entrenchment. 27 
 To avoid these problems, Schmitt introduces a ‘positive concept of 
constitution’. 28 This concept conceives of a constitution as the concrete 
form of collective existence that an already existing political community 
chooses for itself. The act of constitution-giving, then, does not primarily 
consist in the making of particular legal norms with a special procedural 
status. Rather, that act is to be understood as a popular sovereign’s identity-
deﬁ ning choice for a basic blueprint of social and political order. The nature 
of this choice will usually be expressible in a number of basic constitutional 
principles. In the case of the Weimar Republic, for instance, the German 
people, according to Schmitt, decided for a democratic, republican, federal, 
and parliamentary political system committed to the rule of law. 29 These 
basic principles, however, are not mere constitutional laws, i.e. particular 
legal norms contained in the written constitution and protected by an 
amendment clause. They stand above any mere constitutional law and 
deﬁ ne a constitutional core or essence that Schmitt claims is shielded from 
constitutional amendment. Though the Weimar Constitution did not 
explicitly exempt any of its provisions from amendment, Schmitt argued 
that it would be unconstitutional to use the constitutional procedure of 
amendment to, for example, turn Germany into an absolute monarchy or 
a communist society. For constituted powers to do so, even if acting with 
a supermajority, would be to usurp the political community’s prerogative 
to determine (and to re-determine) its concrete form of existence. 30 
 The positive concept of constitution opens the door for Schmitt’s peculiar 
understanding of constitutional guardianship. If the positive constitution is 
 27  Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory (n 11) 67–74. 
 28  Ibid, 75–88. 
 29  Ibid, 77–8. 
 30  Ibid, 148–58. 
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the main object of constitutional guardianship, constitutional guardianship 
cannot consist in the attempt to ensure constitutional legality, i.e. conformity 
of exercises of public power with particular constitutional laws contained 
in the constitution. Rather, constitutional guardianship must guarantee 
that decisions taken by constituted powers do not violate the fundamental 
principles that deﬁ ne the positive constitution. We might be inclined to 
think that this conception of guardianship should lead to a justiﬁ cation for 
judicial review, as protection of fundamental constitutional principles 
against parliamentary majorities. But Schmitt argued that the positive 
constitution cannot be guarded by a court, on the grounds that legitimate 
adjudication must always apply particular laws with a determinate content. 
Schmitt therefore held that the task of guarding the positive constitution is 
a political and not a judicial task, and that it must, therefore, fall to the 
president, making use of his powers of dictatorship under Article 48. 31 
 In order to show that courts cannot legitimately apply constitutional 
principles, Schmitt does not directly rely on the friend–enemy conception 
of the political. In  The Guardian of the Constitution (as well as in other 
works directly concerned with the legitimacy of constitutional review), he 
offers an alternative account of what makes a question political, on the 
basis of an argument from disagreement that resembles, at ﬁ rst glance, a 
currently popular argument against judicial review associated with the 
work of Jeremy Waldron. 32 
 Schmitt’s concrete discussion of the problem of constitutional review 
might be described as an attempt to limit the implications of Justice 
Marshall’s famous argument in  Marbury v. Madison . 33 Schmitt does not 
appear to deny the truth of the key premise of that argument: He admits 
that constitutional norms constitute a higher law that governs the legality 
of ordinary legislative action, such that ordinary laws that conﬂ ict with 
constitutional norms must lack legal validity. What is more, Schmitt seems 
to agree with Marshall’s view that a judge’s duty to decide cases arriving 
in his court in accordance with the law would require a judge not to apply 
an ordinary law that violates a constitutional norm and thus lacks legal 
validity. 
 31  Schmitt,  Der Hüter der Verfassung (n 9) 132–59. See also C Schmitt, ‘Die Diktatur des 
Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Weimarer Verfassung’, in Schmitt,  Die Diktatur (n 25) 
211–57 and  C  Schmitt ,  Legality and Legitimacy , translated by  Jeffrey  Seitzer ( Duke University 
Press ,  Durham, NC ,  2004 )  67 – 83 . 
 32  See  J  Waldron ,  Law and Disagreement ( Oxford University Press ,  Oxford ,  1999 ) ; 
 J  Waldron , ‘ The Core of the Case for Judicial Review ’ ( 2006 )  115  Yale Law Journal  1346 –406 ; 
 R  Bellamy ,  Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of 
Democracy ( Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge ,  2007 ). 
 33  Schmitt,  Der Hüter der Verfassung (n 9) 12–48. 
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 What Schmitt is concerned to claim in  The Guardian of the Constitution 
is that this argument only sufﬁ ces to justify an extremely restricted form of 
judicial review. Schmitt plausibly maintains that the question whether an 
ordinary law violates a constitutional provision will sometimes be difﬁ cult 
to answer. To be sure, there might be instances in which the conﬂ ict 
between a constitutional law and an ordinary law will be glaringly obvious. 
But we should expect that there will be cases in which even knowledgeable 
and reasonable observers who judge in good faith will disagree with respect 
to the question whether some ordinary law conﬂ icts with a constitutional 
provision. Marshall’s argument, Schmitt claims, can only apply to trivial 
cases of obvious conﬂ ict between constitutional norms and ordinary laws, 
and it therefore fails to establish the legitimacy of judicial review in the 
harder cases that are characterized by reasonable disagreement over the 
meaning of the constitution. 34 
 Schmitt’s reasons for so restricting the implications of Marshall’s 
argument are based on a peculiar, extremely narrow understanding of 
what it means for a judge to decide in accordance with or on the basis of 
the law. Though he elsewhere emphasizes the idea that all judicial decisions 
contain a moment of pure discretion, 35 Schmitt comes close, in  The 
Guardian of the Constitution , to denying that judges can ever have any 
legitimate decisional authority: 
 The special position of the judge in the rule of law-state, his objectivity, 
his elevation above the parties, his independence and the fact that he is 
not removable, all this depends solely on the fact that he decides on the 
basis of a law, and on the fact that the content of his decision is derived 
from another decision that is already contained in the law in a measurable 
and calculable way. 36 
 According to the view outlined here, a judge, strictly speaking, cannot 
legitimately decide. All a judge can legitimately do is to execute or apply 
decisions already taken by someone else. Of course, such avoidance of 
judicial decision-taking is possible only if the execution or application in 
question does not require any interesting form of practical judgment that 
might give rise to disagreement. 
 Another way to put the same point is to say that judges, in Schmitt’s 
view, necessarily lack legitimate authority. According to the way the term 
 34  For this reason, Schmitt tried to contain the claim of the Weimar Reichsgericht to be a 
‘guardian of the constitution’ as far as possible. See Schmitt, ‘Das Reichsgericht als Hüter der 
Verfassung’ (n 11). 
 35  Schmitt,  Political Theology (n 6) 30–1. 
 36  Schmitt,  Der Hüter der Verfassung (n 9) 37–8. See also Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory 
(n 11) 169–96. 
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‘authority’ is usually understood in contemporary legal and political 
philosophy, a person or institution A has legitimate authority over another 
person or institution B if and only if A’s decisions in some matter bind B, 
within certain limits, regardless of whether B thinks the decision was 
substantively correct. 37 Needless to say, courts are usually taken to possess 
authority, so understood, with respect to the interpretation of the law. 
However, Schmitt seems to deny that courts can have authority, at least 
where it seems most relevant, namely within the sphere of disagreement 
about how to interpret the law. Wherever the results of applying the law 
are perfectly ‘measurable’ or ‘calculable’, decisional authority won’t be 
needed to justify the results of application. But wherever authority would 
have to be invoked to justify the results of application, because these 
results are no longer fully ‘measurable’ or ‘calculable’, courts, in Schmitt’s 
view, have no business to interfere, lest the rule of law be undermined. 
 Schmitt’s overall conclusion concerning the legitimacy of constitutional 
adjudication, then, comes to this: Unless the conﬂ ict between a constitutional 
norm and an ordinary law is so trivial as to obviate the need for potentially 
controversial judgment, judges must not be allowed to strike down or not 
to apply ordinary laws suspected of unconstitutionality. If the case is not 
altogether trivial, a judgment that denies the constitutionality of some 
ordinary law will require political decision-taking, and political decision-
taking, Schmitt claims, cannot legitimately pertain to the courts. 38 
 Schmitt’s argument from disagreement does not apply merely to the 
courts. Modern critics of judicial review, like Schmitt, hold that judges 
lack authority to decide on the interpretation of the constitution in the 
sphere of disagreement, but they typically argue that the constituted 
parliamentary process has the authority to do so. 39 For Schmitt, this 
approach to the problem of disagreement about constitutional issues is 
foreclosed. Legitimate legislative activity, for Schmitt, is as dependent 
on the presupposition of normality as legitimate judicial activity, since a 
legislator will be unable to formulate general laws that are applicable by 
judges in a measurable and calculable way if a society is affected by 
profound practical disagreement. Every general law will have to contain 
 37  See  RP  Wolff ,  In Defense of Anarchism ( University of California Press ,  Berkeley/Los 
Angeles ,  1998 )  3 – 19 ;  Joseph  Raz ,  The Authority of Law ( 2nd edn ,  Oxford University Press , 
 Oxford ,  2009 )  3 – 27 . 
 38  See Schmitt,  Der Hüter der Verfassung (n 9) 31–2. This view has roots in Schmitt’s early 
work on adjudication, which argued that legal determinacy, as a condition of legitimate 
adjudication, must be grounded in the cultural and ideological homogeneity of the judiciary. 
See  C  Schmitt ,  Gesetz und Urteil: Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Rechtspraxis ( CH Beck , 
 Munich ,  1969 ). 
 39  Waldron,  Law and Disagreement (n 32) 88–118. 
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vague general terms that will lead to determinate results in particular cases 
only if there is a cohesive practice of interpretation that does not give rise 
to practical disagreement. Hence, Schmitt claims that both the system of 
legislation as well as the courts can work properly only relative to an 
already existing background of practical agreement or, to use Schmitt’s 
term, of homogeneity. 40 In a deeply pluralistic society, Schmitt argues, 
majority voting among party-afﬁ liated representatives is likely to do 
nothing more than to empower a part of society to decide on a question 
that concerns the whole while following its sectional interest. 41 A legislative 
decision on the meaning of the constitution must then be as illegitimate as 
judicial review. 
 Now clearly, even if both Schmitt’s arguments against judicial review 
and his arguments against the ‘parliamentary system’ of ordinary legislation 
are sound, they won’t make the problem of disagreement go away. So 
don’t we need an exercise of authority at some point? It seems that 
Schmitt’s attacks on judicial review and on the ‘parliamentary system’ 
only defer that exercise, by denying authority to the courts or parliament. 
But where does the buck stop, with respect to the authoritative settlement 
of social disagreement? 
 In one sense, the answer to this question is of course obvious. In general, 
Schmitt argues that the buck stops with the sovereign who can decide on the 
exception, or, put differently, mobilize the community to draw a friend–
enemy distinction, and use extralegal means to bring about what he deﬁ nes 
as a situation of normality. In the particular context of Schmitt’s interpretation 
of the Weimar Constitution, constitutional guardianship is taken to fall 
to the president: The president, even while he does not have the power to 
change the positive constitution, and is thus not strictly speaking a sovereign, 
does have the power, under Article 48, to suspend all constitutional laws 
and to use dictatorial means to restore a situation of normality adequate to 
the core of the positive constitution. The president’s plebiscitary legitimacy, 
and his alleged neutrality in party-political conﬂ ict make him the only 
constituted power, in Schmitt’s view, that can speak on behalf of the popular 
sovereign and that can interpret and safeguard the positive constitution. The 
dictatorial powers he wields under Article 48 are best understood as a 
residue of the sovereign dictatorship exercised by the constitutional assembly 
that drafted and enacted the Weimar Constitution. 42 
 40  C Schmitt,  Legality and Legitimacy (n 31) 3–26. 
 41  C  Schmitt ,  The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy , translated by  E  Kennedy ( MIT 
Press ,  Cambridge, MA ,  1988 )  1 – 50 ; Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory (n 11) 328–42; Schmitt, 
 Legality and Legitimacy (n 31) 27–36. 
 42  Schmitt, ‘Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten’ (n 31). 
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 This positive conception of executive constitutional guardianship, 
however, does not solve the problem of the source of legitimate decisional 
authority. Recall that an authoritative decision does more than just to end 
a conﬂ ict. It purports to bind those to whom it is addressed regardless 
of whether they agree that the outcome is substantively correct. In other 
words, to exercise authority is not a way to create a situation of normality, 
at least not if normality is understood to involve the absence of 
disagreement. Rather, successful exercises of authority will make normality 
or homogeneity of opinion dispensable. Where authority is successfully 
claimed and exercised, people will recognize that they are bound to a 
collective decision even if they disagree with its wisdom. 
 Schmitt’s president is not exercising authority, so understood. To create 
or maintain normality, Schmitt’s president will suspend the rule of law and 
rely on dictatorial means. As should be clear, the decision on the exception 
establishes a distinction between friend and (internal or external) enemy. 
So in effect, the sovereign’s decision on the exception will declare those 
who disagree to be enemies. 43 But a president who draws a friend–enemy 
distinction does not even claim to have authority over the enemy. He does 
not claim, in other words, that those he declares to be enemies ought to 
recognize his commands as legitimate exercises of authority which bind 
them to obedience. Rather, the president – to use Hobbes’s phrase – returns 
the dispute to the sword to eliminate a threat. In drawing the friend–enemy 
distinction, he is excluding the enemy from the political community. Such 
exclusion signals the end of a political relationship of belonging that might 
give rise to duties of deference to public authority on the part of the dissenter, 
while it also deprives the excluded of any form of legal protection. 44 Neither 
does the president, in drawing the friend–enemy distinction, claim authority 
over those he considers to be friends. Friends will follow the president’s 
lead because they agree with the way in which his decision conceives of the 
community’s substantive identity, and not because they attribute to the 
president a power to take decisions about the community’s identity that 
would bind even if they were wrong. But this is really just another way 
of claiming that the president does not have authority, in the sense 
deﬁ ned above, and that his leadership can never do more than to express 
and politically mobilize a group’s prior agreement on the nature of its 
substantive identity. 
 43  Schmitt,  The Concept of the Political (n 20) 46–7. 
 44  Schmitt repeatedly expressed his agreement with Hobbes’s claim that the state’s claim to 
obedience is conditional on the offer of protection. Hence, he would surely have agreed with 
the view that a declared enemy of the state cannot owe a duty of obedience to the state. See, for 
instance, Schmitt ibid 52. 
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 At the end of the day, Schmitt believes that the kind of constitutional 
disagreement that cannot legitimately be tackled by the courts – and 
this includes, as we have seen, very much all interesting constitutional 
disagreement – can only be dealt with by treating the dissenter (which, 
practically speaking, means the weaker party) as an enemy. When it comes 
to the authoritative settlement of social disagreement, the buck stops 
nowhere, since Schmitt simply does not believe that deep social conﬂ icts 
can ever be settled through exercises of legitimate authority. They can only 
be removed through extralegal violence. The successful exercise of such 
violence, one that creates sufﬁ cient homogeneity, is a necessary condition 
of legitimate or sufﬁ ciently ‘calculable’ legality, but it cannot itself be 
subjected to the rule of law. 
 Let me now come to the promised assessment of Schmitt’s argument 
against the legitimacy of constitutional review. Recall that Schmitt’s criticism 
starts out from the seemingly plausible assumption that judges lack the 
authority to take controversial political decisions and that one cannot turn 
a question that is political into a question that is properly subject to 
adjudication simply by giving a court the competence to decide it. But it now 
seems that judges lack the legitimate authority to settle political conﬂ icts 
created by practical disagreement only because everyone does, and I am 
inclined to think that this shows that something has gone wrong. 
 Let me try to pinpoint the problem more precisely. Schmitt’s understanding 
of what it means for a question to be political, and thus to be non-justiciable, 
is beset by ambiguity. On the one hand, Schmitt explains what it means for 
a question to be political with reference to the argument in  The Concept 
of the Political . According to this conception of the political, a question is 
political if and only if it is taken to concern the very existence of a political 
community. However, this understanding of what makes a question political 
differs from the one that Schmitt is working with in  The Guardian of the 
Constitution . In the latter work, as we have seen, a question is taken to be 
political whenever its solution requires potentially controversial practical 
judgment. 
 These two conceptions of a political question do not appear to be 
coextensive. Members of a political community, clearly, can disagree about 
how their constitution is to be understood, and disagree deeply, while keeping 
the peace and recognizing the authority of a court or of a constituted 
legislature bindingly to interpret the constitution. This would seem to 
leave considerable space for judicial (or, for that matter, legislative) 
exercises of authority and thus to undercut Schmitt’s claim that non-trivial 
social conﬂ icts can never be settled through legally or constitutionally 
deﬁ ned procedures. To make his case against constitutional adjudication 
and for executive constitutional guardianship, Schmitt must therefore 
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identify the two senses of what makes a question political. He must 
pretend, implausibly, that every constitutional dispute that gives rise to 
profound social disagreement inevitably marks a friend–enemy distinction 
and thus calls for the exercise of dictatorial power. 
 To be sure, the settlement of disagreement through constituted 
procedures will not always be free from elements of discretion or even 
arbitrariness. Schmitt is correct to argue that the judicial settlement of 
constitutional conﬂ ict will not typically take the form of an automatic 
application of determinate law with calculable outcomes. However, few 
authors today believe that arbitration of non-trivial practical disagreement 
in judicial form can never be legitimate. Legal theorists, whether of a 
Hartian, Dworkinian, or legal-realist stripe, have long abandoned the view 
that the application of the law in modern liberal democracies can be 
portrayed in formalist terms. But even those who take this to imply that 
judges are frequently engaged in interstitial legislation do not usually draw 
the conclusion that judicial decisions in hard cases must, therefore, 
automatically be illegitimate. 45 And it is surely even less plausible to deny 
all capacity legitimately to deal with political disagreement to the constituted 
legislative institutions. Even those who – like Jeremy Waldron and Richard 
Bellamy – deny the legitimacy of constitutional review, and prefer social 
conﬂ icts to be settled by a parliament, would therefore almost certainly 
reject Schmitt’s radical scepticism about constitutional procedure. 
 Of course, these observations leave us with real questions as to where to 
draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate judicial or legislative 
arbitration of political conﬂ ict. Schmitt, however, is not very interested in 
addressing those questions, since it is not really his intention to offer a 
viable theory of the limitations of legitimate judicial or legislative power. 
Rather, by conﬂ ating the two senses of what makes a question political, 
Schmitt wants to shift as much power as possible to the executive, in order 
to give the executive elbow-room to engage in homogenizing dictatorial 
action. As I have shown, this tendency should not be understood as merely 
a context-bound reaction to the terminal crisis of the Weimar Constitution. 
It is rooted in Schmitt’s theory of politics and is characteristic of all his 
works in legal and constitutional theory. 
 A defender of Schmitt’s view might reply that there can be no agreed-
upon criteria for deciding whether a political conﬂ ict constitutes an 
existential threat to political community and therefore requires extralegal 
 45  Debate among post-Hartian legal theorists is typically concerned with the question what 
judges do when they decide ‘hard cases’, whether they legislate or, in some sense, apply a higher 
law, not with the question whether hard cases can legitimately be decided by courts. Positivists 
and natural law theorists agree that they can. 
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action. If it is admitted that some conﬂ icts are political in that sense, and, 
consequently, not amenable to judicial arbitration, a political community, 
or political leaders acting in its name, must be entitled to draw a friend–
enemy distinction and to take a decision on the exception. The view that a 
question must be regarded as non-justiciable whenever the executive 
decides that it is will then be unavoidable. 
 This reply is based on a  non sequitur . That it is possible for societies to 
fall into civil war does not entail that a good constitution ought to endow 
the executive with a standing power to declare civil war, preemptively, on 
those who are perceived as dissenting from a community’s substantive 
identity. It is of course imaginable that a community might come to 
understand its own identity in such a way that the majority of its members 
will experience all dissent from the community’s momentarily prevailing 
ethos as a mortal threat to their collective existence that can only be 
violently eliminated if the community is to survive. If a community so 
deﬁ nes itself, the two senses of the political that I distinguished above will 
indeed coincide, as Schmitt claims, and its members are likely to be willing 
to accept executive dictatorship as a standing constitutional possibility. 
 However, most of us would surely ﬁ nd this ideal of community highly 
unattractive. If constitutionalism and the rule of law are to be more than 
empty words, they must at the very least imply that those who are citizens, 
under declared constitutional laws, and who behave law-abidingly, cannot 
simply be disenfranchised or deprived of legal protection through executive 
acts, on the ground that their opinions, ideals, or way of life are perceived 
as a threat to a community’s prevailing substantive identity. A liberal and 
democratic community betrays its own ideals if it does not trust itself to 
be able, at least within certain limits, to renegotiate its own identity in 
peaceful and lawful form. 
 One might argue that this option was no longer available in the late 
Weimar Republic. Responsibility for this condition, however, must rest in 
large part with those who, like Schmitt, were all too keen to narrow down 
the sphere in which legal conﬂ ict-resolution might have been able to operate, 
and to resist the establishment of a fully developed system of constitutional 
review. The failure of the  Staatsgerichtshof , as Kelsen rightly pointed out, 
did not result from a failure on the part of court to remain mindful of the 
essential limits of legitimate judicial activity. It was the result, rather, of the 
success of the regressive constitutional ideology advocated by Schmitt. 
 Schmitt’s denial of the justiciability of international conﬂ ict 
 Schmitt’s writings throughout the Weimar period manifest a strong concern 
with the problem of the rule of law in international conﬂ ict. The context 
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of Schmitt’s initial interest in this issue is the political reorganization of 
Europe after the First World War. The treaty of Versailles was widely 
believed to be illegitimate in Germany, and the governments of the Weimar 
Republic, regardless of ideological orientation, were all committed to the 
goal of revision of the treaty. There was disagreement, however, over the 
question whether such revision should be pursued peacefully, through 
Germany’s integration into the international legal framework established 
after the war, or through a later use (or threat of the use) of military force. 46 
 Schmitt’s major early writings on international legality are concerned 
with two speciﬁ c questions that arose in this context. First, Schmitt wrote 
extensively, and from a highly sceptical perspective, on the question 
whether Germany should become a member of the League of Nations and 
be willing to support the mechanisms for the judicial arbitration of 
international conﬂ ict envisaged by the covenant of the League. 47 Second, 
Schmitt developed trenchant criticisms of the international initiatives for 
the legal prohibition of aggressive war, and urged that Germany resist 
those initiatives. 48 In both cases, Schmitt’s point of view was strongly 
inﬂ uenced by the assumption that international law is closely analogous to 
constitutional law and subject to the same essential limitations. 
 Schmitt’s assessment of the League of Nations provides a good illustration 
of how he perceived the analogy between constitutional and international 
law.  The Core Question of the League of Nations , ﬁ rst published in 1926, 
the year in which Germany became a member of the League, concludes 
with a fundamental criticism of international juridiﬁ cation that matches 
the argument against constitutional review almost word for word. 
Expressing doubts concerning the wisdom of Germany’s entry into the 
League of Nations Schmitt writes: 
 A further danger is to be seen in the fact that … an appearance of law 
and legal process is extended to political conﬂ icts that are not amenable 
to a formal procedure. After a number of bad experiences, all friends of 
the law fear nothing more than political trials and a politicization of 
adjudication. … Now, if one were to organize the settlement of all 
international conﬂ icts in such a way as to subject all states to a judicial 
or at least a formal procedure, one would, assuming that all are indeed 
willing to subject themselves, impose on international law the burden of 
 46  P  Krüger ,  Die Aussenpolitik der Republik von Weimar ( Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft , 
 Darmstadt ,  1993 ). 
 47  C Schmitt,  Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes in  C  Schmitt ,  Frieden oder Paziﬁ smus? 
Arbeiten zum Völkerrecht und zur internationalen Politik 1924–1973 , edited by  G  Maschke 
( Duncker & Humblot ,  Berlin ,  2005 )  73 – 128 . 
 48  C Schmitt,  The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War in  C  Schmitt ,  Writings on 
War , translated by  T  Nunan ( Polity Press ,  Cambridge ,  2011 )  30 – 74 . 
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deciding the most terrible conﬂ icts without any clear principles or stable 
rules but in the name of the law. … Political adjudication would receive 
a new ﬁ eld of competence, a ﬁ eld of great, almost fantastical extension, 
and we would see political trials that intensify the injustice of such trials 
to the awesome dimension of world-political conﬂ ict. Who could dare to 
attempt this worst endangerment of the law in the name of the law? 49 
 Once again, we are told that there are political questions that are inherently 
non-justiciable. To subject such questions to a judicial procedure would 
only mix up law with politics and thus necessarily lead to illegitimate 
results. Schmitt goes so far as to say that ‘political justice’ does not just 
lack legitimacy, it is also unjust. And the injustices that must result from 
an attempt to subject all international disputes to legal regulation, Schmitt 
adds, would be of enormous magnitude. This assessment concludes a 
general critique of the League of Nations, a critique which is based on the 
view that the conditions of the legitimacy of an international regime that 
aspires to the legal regulation of the use of force among states must be very 
similar to the conditions of the legitimacy of a domestic constitution. The 
core question concerning the League of Nations, in Schmitt’s view, is the 
question whether it is a real union (in German, whether the ‘Völkerbund’ 
is a genuine ‘Bund’) or only a looser international organization that 
facilitates certain forms of coordination among sovereign states. 50 
 Schmitt’s discussion of this question should be read in the context of the 
theory of federalism offered in  Constitutional Theory . 51 This theory takes 
up a question that had greatly exercised the constitutional theorists of the 
Wilhelmine Empire, namely whether the uniﬁ ed German state that had 
been created in 1871 ought to be regarded as a  Staatenbund , a federation 
of independent states retaining their individual sovereignty, or as a 
 Bundesstaat , a sovereign federal state divided into a number of subordinate 
constituent states that are no longer sovereign. Schmitt argues that neither 
of these two options captures the essence of a true  Bund or union. 
 The ﬁ rst key characteristic of a union is that its constituent states have 
at least partially given up their  ius ad bellum . On the one hand, they no 
longer retain the power to make war against each other, but are committed 
to settling all their disputes with one another peacefully and on the basis 
of the constitutional law laid down in a treaty of union. On the other 
hand, the government of a union acquires the right to draw friend–enemy 
distinctions that are binding on all constituent states, while the latter are 
bound to support any war declared by the federation against external 
 49  Schmitt,  Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes (n 47) 127–8. 
 50  Ibid, 84. 
 51  Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory (n 11) 381–95. 
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enemies. Nevertheless, to come to the second key characteristic of a union, 
the reason for which constituent states enter into a treaty of union is to 
preserve their political existence as independent states. For this reason, 
every true union, Schmitt argues, must guarantee the preservation, and in 
particular the territorial integrity, of all constituent states. 
 These two key features of a true union, Schmitt claims, stand in tension 
with one another. The possession of a  ius ad bellum, as we have seen, is 
the deﬁ nitive mark of political existence. 52 This would appear to imply 
that, in a true union, it is the union and not its constituent states that has 
political existence. However, Schmitt insists that it would be wrong to 
assimilate the union to a centralized state with a single sovereign. Such a 
state, after all, would not have to regard its own division into constituent 
states, or the separation of competences between the central and the local 
level, as anything more than an administrative convenience, open 
to change on the basis of the unilateral decision of a unitary sovereign. It 
is therefore essential to a true union, in Schmitt’s view, that the question 
of ultimate sovereignty be permanently deferred or left open. 
 Such deferral, Schmitt argues, is possible only on the condition that the 
constituent states of a union exhibit sufﬁ cient political homogeneity to 
rule out the possibility of violent conﬂ ict within the union. In particular, it is 
necessary that all members of a union mutually recognize their respective 
forms of government and their territorial possessions as legitimate and 
normal. On the condition that there is sufﬁ cient homogeneity, it will 
become possible to settle conﬂ icts among constituent states through 
judicial procedures, on the basis of the treaty of union. The background of 
agreement will make the process of interpreting and applying the treaty’s 
provisions sufﬁ ciently calculable to count as proper adjudication, and the 
process can be expected not to adversely affect the vital interests of any 
constituent state. 53 Schmitt’s condition for the legitimacy of a supranational 
rule of law, in other words, is the same as the condition of the legitimacy 
of a domestic constitution, namely the antecedent removal, by extra-
legal means, of the potential for serious internal conﬂ ict and political 
disagreement among the states associated by a treaty of union. 
 The Covenant of the League of Nations, in Schmitt’s view, deliberately fails 
to settle the question whether the League is or is intended to become a real 
union. If the covenant was to be understood as constituting a real union, 
Schmitt argues, German accession to the League of Nations would have to be 
interpreted as implying a recognition of the legitimacy of the territorial  status 
quo in Europe. For Germany to offer such recognition would be acceptable, 
 52  Ibid, 383. 
 53  Ibid, 388–95. 
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Schmitt holds, only if the League of Nations exhibited the homogeneity of a 
real union, and if it offered Germany an opportunity to pursue what Schmitt 
takes to be its right to territorial revision within a shared constitutional 
framework capable of producing genuinely collective decisions. This condition, 
however, is unsatisﬁ ed, as Germany’s traditional enemies would never allow 
it to employ the mechanisms of the covenant to pursue revision of the  status 
quo . Schmitt concludes that the League is nothing but a charade by which the 
Western powers seek to deprive Germany of what he takes to be its legal and 
moral right to forcibly revise a  status quo that is patently unjust and too 
abnormal to carry a legitimate legal order capable of judicial enforcement. 54 
 The parallels of Schmitt’s argument against international legalization to his 
attack on constitutional review should be obvious enough. Schmitt does not 
argue that the problem of disagreement is typically even deeper in international 
politics than in domestic politics, and he does not claim that the institutions of 
international law are presently defective in some remediable way. Schmitt 
claims, rather, that the international rule of law is in principle incapable of 
making any positive contribution to the solution of non-trivial international 
disputes. Just as a judicially enforced domestic constitution, if it is to be 
legitimate, can do no more than to express an agreement or a homogeneity 
that has already been brought about through non-legal means, legitimate 
international adjudication can only ratify the results of a shared perception of 
normality arrived at through political means. 55 Schmitt holds that any other 
use of international legality for the binding settlement of international conﬂ ict 
can be nothing more than a veiled instrument of oppression. 
 It is now time to ask whether this sweeping thesis should be considered 
more acceptable in the international than in the constitutional case. I will 
argue that it is not. Schmitt’s attack on international legality rests on the 
same unconvincing assimilation of all political disagreement to existential 
conﬂ ict that undercuts his argument against the domestic rule of law. 
 What are the catastrophic injustices that Schmitt thinks must inevitably 
result from the binding judicial settlement of non-trivial international 
conﬂ ict, as envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations? And how 
can a non-legalized international politics avoid those injustices? As far as 
I can see, there are three different lines of argument in Schmitt’s writings 
that are meant to answer these questions: the claim that a scheme for the 
judicial settlement of international conﬂ ict may come to protect a 
substantively unjust  status quo , the claim that such a scheme threatens 
political self-determination, and the claim that it will only fuel violent 
international conﬂ ict instead of limiting it. 
 54  Schmitt,  Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes (n 47) 127–8. 
 55  Ibid, 86–7, 115–26. 
 114  lars vinx
 The ﬁ rst of these three worries certainly deserves to be taken seriously. 
It fails, however, to establish that binding international adjudication is 
an inherently illegitimate method of conﬂ ict-resolution. Admittedly, an 
international legal order that outlaws the use of force to bring about 
revision of the legal  status quo may come to protect a substantively unjust 
 status quo that merely enshrines the morally contingent outcome of an 
earlier resort to force. This problem will likely be particularly pressing if 
that order also tends to foreclose peaceful revision of the legal  status quo , 
by endowing those who beneﬁ t from the  status quo with a power to veto legal 
change. Under such conditions, the attempt to make resort to international 
adjudicative institutions compulsory in all cases of international conﬂ ict 
would, by itself, fail to provide an adequate remedy against legal injustice. 56 
 Schmitt was certainly not alone in perceiving the legal order created by 
the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in this light, though 
more cautious critics argued for the adoption of a forward-looking approach 
that would accept the legitimacy of the  status quo so as to give Europe the 
chance of a peaceful future. 57 But let us grant to Schmitt that legally 
unauthorized resort to force might be morally legitimate in extreme cases, 
where there is no other option for a community to defend its vital interests 
or for bystanders to help protect basic human rights. This concession, as 
recent debate on the legality of international uses of force has made clear, 
does not necessarily imply that a legal regime that may, in exceptional 
cases, have to be violated on moral grounds ought to be abandoned or 
fundamentally changed. Even where there is sufﬁ cient moral reason to 
break a legal rule in a particular case, it may well be better to continue to 
uphold that legal rule. 58 Schmitt, in any case, does not want to restrict 
the legitimate use of force to exceptional instances, in which it might be 
the only way to overturn a severely unjust legal  status quo . Rather, he argues 
that international law ought to continue to recognize that a state’s decision 
to go to war should under no circumstances be held to be illegal. 59 There 
seems to be little reason, to put it charitably, to expect that this alternative 
 56  Schmitt,  Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes (n 47) 98–114. 
 57  For instance,  JM  Keynes ,  The Economic Consequences of the Peace ( Harcourt, Brace 
and Howe ,  New York ,  1920 )  140 –1. 
 58  M  Byers and  S  Chesterman , ‘ Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Intervention 
and the Future of International Law ’ in  JL  Holzgrefe and  R  Keohane (eds),  Humanitarian 
Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas ( Cambridge University Press ,  Cambridge , 
 2003 )  177 – 203 . 
 59  Schmitt,  The Concept of the Political (n 20) 45–58; Schmitt,  The Turn to the 
Discriminating Concept of War (n 48) 62–74. Schmitt also argued that international law 
had not in fact come to develop a crime of aggressive war before 1939. See C Schmitt,  The 
International Crime of the War of Aggression and the Principle ‘Nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege’ in Schmitt,  Writings on War (n 48) 125–97. 
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would produce results more substantively just than  any conceivable 
framework for the judicial settlement of international conﬂ ict. If the legal 
 status quo is likely going to reﬂ ect unjust or morally contingent distributions 
of power, then so,  a fortiori , are the results of the exercise of an unrestricted 
 ius ad bellum . 
 Instead of criticizing the legal  status quo as unjust, Schmitt’s second 
argument claims that international legalization is incompatible with 
political self-determination. The Schmitt of  The Concept of the Political 
argues, as we have seen, that in order to enjoy true political existence, a 
community must consider itself to be free from any international legal 
obligation that purports to bind it against its own continuing will. This 
requirement has both a material and a procedural aspect. On a material 
level, a community’s willingness to consider itself bound to norms of  ius 
cogens – norms from which a derogation is not permitted, so that treaties 
violating them have no legal force 60 – would be incompatible with political 
self-determination, since such subjection would curtail a community’s 
freedom to express its own political identity in whatever form it sees ﬁ t. It 
would establish the indirect rule of those who determine the content of  ius 
cogens . On a procedural level, a community, if it is to enjoy genuine self-
determination, must refuse to accept subjection to any regime of international 
legal norms of which it is not itself the ultimate interpreter or from which 
it is not permitted to withdraw unilaterally by invoking its vital interests. 
This much would seem to follow from Schmitt’s committment to the view 
that a people’s sovereignty cannot be alienated through the consent of its 
constituted governmental institutions . 61 
 It should give us pause, however, that many contemporary states, including 
some that we would surely not hesitate to describe as politically independent, 
seem to fail Schmitt’s standard, for the reason that they recognize norms of 
 ius cogens , including the prohibition of legally unauthorized resort to war, 
and support the cause of building international institutions endowed with 
conclusive authority. So Schmitt must explain, to make his second criticism 
work, why it would be mistaken for jurisprudence to operate with a less 
radical notion of political self-determination that does not take independence 
to be incompatible with subjection to a system of international law 
enforced by international courts. However, Schmitt’s argument from self-
determination, by itself, has very little to say about the issue. Schmitt 
insistently claims that a community that no longer takes its own decision on 
friend and enemy, unhampered by constraints of legality, no longer exists as 
a political community. A community’s attempts to defend its political 
 60  A  Cassesse ,  International Law ( 2nd edn ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford ,  2005 )  198 – 212 . 
 61  Schmitt,  Constitutional Theory (n 11) 140–6. 
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existence in whatever way it sees ﬁ t, Schmitt adds, do not stand in need of 
normative justiﬁ cation. Such matters, we are informed, are ‘existential’ and 
not ‘normative’. 62 
 The problem with this line of argument is that it begs the question 
against the proponent of international legalization. The argument assumes 
that there is no meaningful way to give a less demanding deﬁ nition of 
political existence or independence than Schmitt is willing to countenance, 
for example as a legal status of sovereign equality conferred and protected 
by international law. 63 But this assumption is precisely what is at issue 
between Schmitt and the proponent of international legalization, and 
Schmitt’s argument from political existence simply does not speak to the 
question. It presupposes the claim that legal institutions can never 
legitimately settle any non-trivial practical disagreement, that all subjection 
to law must really be subjection to some other community’s dominating 
will, a view that has already turned out to be implausible in the constitutional 
context. Or, to put the point in a slightly different way, Schmitt’s argument 
from self-determination assumes that we already agree with his conception 
of the political, a conception that  deﬁ nes a community’s political existence 
in terms of the possession of an unrestricted  ius ad bellum and in terms of 
non-subjection to binding international (or constitutional) law. Hence, the 
argument will hold no attraction to those who think that Schmitt failed to 
give a convincing account of the nature of the political. 
 Schmitt, to be sure, does put forward a further consideration that would, 
if it were sound, support the conclusion he wants to draw from his 
conception of self-determination. Schmitt cautions against the introduction 
of a ‘discriminating concept of war’ 64 or, in other words, against the 
attempt to outlaw aggressive war as a legitimate instrument of policy. 
 Attempts to outlaw aggressive war, culminating in the Kellog–Briand 
Pact, played a prominent role in the diplomacy of the inter-war period. 
This political movement towards outlawing aggressive war was supported, 
moreover, by important theorists of international law, for example by 
Hans Kelsen and Hersh Lauterpacht. 65 Both Kelsen and Lauterpacht 
emphatically rejected the claim that any part of the conduct of states 
should be seen as exempt from the law on the ground of a distinction 
between legal and purely political questions. If international law is to be 
 62  Ibid, 76, 138. 
 63  B  Fassbender , ‘ Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law ’ in  N  Walker 
(ed),  Sovereignty in Transition ( Hart Publishing ,  Oxford ,  2003 )  115 –43. 
 64  In Schmitt,  The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War (n 48). 
 65  Lauterpacht,  The Function of Law in the International Community (n 4);  H  Kelsen ,  Law 
and Peace in International Relations. The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1940–41 ( Harvard 
University Press ,  Cambridge, MA ,  1942 ). 
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regarded as a genuine legal system, it must claim to regulate all international 
use of force. Any use of force in the international sphere, in other words, 
ought to be interpreted either as a sanction against a violation of law or as 
a punishable delict. Whether a use of force is justiﬁ ed as a sanction or 
amounts to a delict is a legal question that can, in principle, always be 
decided by a court, since a resort to force must amount to a delict, once 
the assumption of completeness is accepted, where the opposing state has 
been found not to have violated its international obligations. Kelsen 
and Lauterpacht consequently advocated the subjection of international 
conﬂ ict to the binding adjudication of a system of international courts, 
and argued that the limits of international legalization are not set by 
inherent limitations of legality but by the political will of the sovereigns. 
 The introduction of a discriminating concept of war, Schmitt held 
against Kelsen and Lauterpacht, is not going to pacify international 
politics. Rather, it is only going to make war more total and destructive. 
Schmitt’s argument sets out from a historical reﬂ ection, and claims that 
the public international law of the Westphalian epoch was highly successful 
in limiting and restraining the destructive consequences of warfare. 
Though the period of classical early-modern statehood was by no means 
paciﬁ c, the belligerent states tended to observe the restraints of the  ius in 
bello rather carefully. This limitation of the consequences of warfare, 
Schmitt argues, depended on a non-discriminating concept of war. 
Classical public international law did not draw a distinction between those 
who had a just cause to go to war and those who lacked it, at least none 
that had any legal consequences. Rather, all parties to a conﬂ ict, as long as 
they could lay claim to the status of sovereign statehood, were presumed 
to be legitimate belligerents. 66 
 Schmitt goes on to observe that the attempt to subject the international 
use of force to the rule of law, through the demand that any use of force 
must either be regarded as a delict or as a sanction, will inevitably 
undermine the idea of mutually legitimate belligerency. The sanction–
delict schema forces us to regard at least one of the parties to any violent 
international conﬂ ict as a violator of the law. The conditions for the 
legality or illegality of uses of force, Schmitt fears, will likely be drawn 
from the tradition of just war theory, so that the question of legality will 
become fused with the question of justice. As a result, those who claim to 
have the law on their side will, in case of armed conﬂ ict, feel entitled to 
loosen the restraints of the  ius in bello in trying to overcome their allegedly 
unjust and criminal enemy. The de-legitimized opponent, knowing that he 
 66  C  Schmitt ,  The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum , translated by  G  Ulmen ( Telos Press ,  New York ,  2003 ) chaps III and IV. 
 118  lars vinx
will be punished as a criminal in case he loses the war, will come to lack 
an incentive to observe the constraints of the  ius in bello on his part. 
Hence, the attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law will unleash 
a destructive dynamic towards total war. 67 
 Schmitt’s claim that a discriminating concept of war is only going to 
make international conﬂ ict worse is clearly meant to suggest that the 
Western powers that advocated the introduction of such a concept of war 
were the real aggressors in the global conﬂ icts of the twentieth century. 
When the vast majority of the members of the League of Nations, invoking 
the covenant, organized sanctions to prevent fascist Italy from successfully 
concluding its aggressive war against Ethiopia in 1935, some legal 
observers argued that non-members of the League of Nations not 
participating in the sanctions – a category that included Germany, which 
had left the League of Nations in 1933 – should not be allowed to invoke 
the traditional rights of neutrality in the dispute between Italy and the 
League of Nations. 68 
 In his response to these arguments, Schmitt correctly observes that this 
position assumes that the coalition arrayed against Italy is acting on 
behalf of the international community of states, and that it consequently 
possesses the authority to take a decision concerning the legitimacy of 
Italy’s resort to force which binds all other states. The assumption of 
such authority, for Schmitt, is nothing more than a disguised claim to 
global hegemony on the part of Britain and France that carries an implicit 
denial of the independent political existence of the German people. 69 To 
maintain its independence, Germany must, therefore, be willing to defend 
the classical, non-discriminating concept of war against the universalist 
pretensions of the Western Allies. 70 The aggressions of Nazi Germany, 
Schmitt would argue in 1941, should therefore be seen as a legitimate 
attempt to create a new condition of normality that would be able to 
support a global version of the classical, non-discriminating concept of 
war that had governed the relationships of European sovereigns. The 
war, Schmitt argued, would establish a new territorial division of the 
earth into ideologically homogeneous spheres of hegemony, each 
controlled by a great power strong enough to continue to exist politically 
 67  Schmitt,  The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War (n 48) 62–74; Schmitt, 
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 68  JF  Williams , ‘ Sanctions Under the Covenant ’ ( 1936 )  17  British Yearbook of International 
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 69  Schmitt,  The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War (n 48) 65. 
 70  Ibid, 69, 71. 
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under the forbidding circumstances created by modern military 
technology. 71 
 Arguably, Schmitt’s polemic against the discriminating concept of war 
should not be rejected solely because Schmitt used it to justify Nazist 
aggression. However, Schmitt’s argument fails even if we focus on its 
substantial claims, as it blurs the distinction between two very different 
forms of discrimination in the assessment of the justiﬁ ability of the 
international use of force. On the one hand, a discriminatory concept of 
war might distinguish between legal and illegal uses of force. On the other 
hand, it might distinguish between substantively just and substantively 
unjust uses of force, on the basis of a moral theory of just war. Though 
Schmitt typically assumes that these two forms of discrimination will 
go hand in hand, it should be evident that they have a rather different 
ideological basis and may well lead to very different evaluations of one 
and the same international conﬂ ict. 
 According to the current legal regime, international uses of force not 
authorized by the UN Security Council are considered impermissible 
unless undertaken in self-defence. The point of this regime, one might 
plausibly argue, is not to establish a moral disqualiﬁ cation of one or 
another party in an international conﬂ ict that would allow for a loosening 
of  ius in bello constraints. The point – much as in the case of the state’s 
claim to a domestic monopoly of legitimate power – is to stop violence 
from escalating and to provide room for a diplomatic or legal, and hence 
a peaceful, resolution of conﬂ ict. 72 The scheme for the settlement of 
international conﬂ ict envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations 
was based on the same idea, in that it tried to commit states to undergo a 
compulsory process of arbitration before resorting to war. 73 
 Moral theorists of just war, by contrast, frequently claim that aggressive 
uses of force that are impermissible under current public international law 
may well be justiﬁ ed or even required on moral grounds and that the law, 
in such cases, should give way to the demands of justice. Such views have 
gained in popularity in recent years, in the context of attempts to justify 
Western military interventions in developing countries that cannot be 
grounded on the right of self-defence and that are not authorized by the 
 71  C Schmitt,  The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for 
Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law in 
Schmitt,  Writings on War (n 48) 75–124. Schmitt’s position after 1945 was to claim that the 
new ‘nomos of the earth’ was yet to come, and to denigrate the postwar political order as a 
‘global civil war’. The Second World War, in other words, had unfortunately been won by the 
wrong people. 
 72  Cassesse,  International Law (n 60) 55–9. 
 73  See arts 12–17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
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Security Council. It is argued, for instance, that coalitions of morally 
superior democratic states should be permitted to engage in aggressive war 
at their own discretion and in disregard of current international law in 
order to protect human rights or to unseat morally unsavoury regimes. 74 
Some authors involved in the renaissance of moral theories of just war 
have explicitly defended the view, as predicted by Schmitt, that the moral 
discrimination between just and unjust causes for war on the level of  ius 
ad bellum is incompatible with the idea of mutually legitimate belligerency 
that characterizes the traditional  ius in bello . Those who ﬁ ght without a 
just cause cannot have a moral right to kill their opponents, and it must 
therefore be morally wrong, at least from the perspective of ideal theory, 
to extend equal  in bello -protection to both sides of a conﬂ ict and to shield 
those who ﬁ ght without a just cause from punishment as long as they do 
not commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. 75 
 Clearly, Schmitt’s attack on the discriminatory concept of war makes 
good sense if it is understood as a cautionary note on the renaissance of 
moral theories of just war, and on the idea that such theories should 
directly guide the international use of force. However, this does not show 
that it also makes good sense if understood as a critique of the attempt to 
subject international uses of force to the rule of law. The latter project, 
after all, is based on the conviction that no state should be allowed to use 
aggressive force at its own discretion, whether on the ground of reasons of 
power or interest or on the ground of purported moral concerns. Global 
legalism, insofar as it aims to prevent all legally unauthorized resort 
to force, may well be the best antidote to the dangers of a self-serving 
moralism of the powerful. 76 
 None of Schmitt’s three attacks on the legitimacy of global legalism, 
I conclude, are fully convincing. This result should not occasion surprise. 
Schmitt’s real aim in attacking international legality is not to criticize the 
legal  status quo after the First World War for being an unjust expression 
of mere power or to ﬁ nd a principled solution to the problem that 
international law has a tendency to bend to the hegemonic interests of the 
powerful. Schmitt evidently believed that Germany – at least if it was freed 
of what Schmitt described as its ‘spiritual subjection’ to liberal ideology 77 
 74  A  Buchanan , ‘ Institutionalizing the Just War ’ in  A  Buchanan ,  Human Rights, Legitimacy, 
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– would be strong enough to maintain a true political existence, by drawing 
its own friend–enemy distinctions, in a world of power politics not subject 
to legal control. His denial of the very possibility of legitimate international 
legality under conditions of profound disagreement or conﬂ ict, then, was 
born of the same intention that guided his attempt to deny the possibility 
of constitutional conﬂ ict-resolution: To rally Germans to the ﬁ ght against 
those whom Schmitt considered to be Germany’s internal and external 
enemies, by portraying all political conﬂ ict as existential conﬂ ict. 
 To admit that international conﬂ ict might be amenable to legal 
resolution, and to advise Germany’s constructive participation in the 
international legal order that could have come into being in the inter-war 
period, would have defeated Schmitt’s attempt to preserve political enmity 
by undermining the prospect of paciﬁ cation through law. Schmitt’s 
position, as in the realm of domestic constitutional law, is not based on 
some profound insight into the inherent limits of legality. It is based, 
rather, on the questionable normative assumption that it is undesirable for 
politics to be subjected to the rule of law. 
 Conclusion: The analogy between constitutional and international law 
and modern scepticism about international law 
 Though I have been critical of Schmitt’s arguments against legalization, 
I do not contest the observation that there is an analogy between 
constitutional and international law. As Jack Goldsmith and Darryl 
Levinson have recently argued, both constitutional and international law 
are relatively indeterminate even today, in the sense that decisions taken 
under constitutional or international law continue to be less predictable 
and require more open moral and political judgment than decisions taken 
on the basis of ordinary municipal law. What is more, compliance with 
both contemporary constitutional and international law cannot be 
explained as a result of the fear of a powerful sovereign capable of 
enforcing the law against all those who are expected to conform to it. 
Finally, both constitutional and international law, Goldsmith and Levinson 
argue, still stand in tension with the idea of the sovereignty, insofar as 
they purport to constitute and to bind sovereign power. 78 Given this 
contemporary support, it would be wrong to dismiss the analogy of 
constitutional and international law as a symptom of the underdevelopment 
of constitutional and international law in Schmitt’s time. 
 78  See Goldsmith and Levinson, ‘Law for States’ (n 2). Schmitt’s opponent Hans Kelsen 
concurred with the view that constitutional and international law are analogous. See Kelsen, 
‘Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit’ (n 8) 1862–64. 
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 What is problematic about Schmitt’s view, I submit, is the normative 
prescription that Schmitt wants to draw from the analogy, namely to reject 
legal methods of conﬂ ict-resolution as inherently illegitimate whenever the 
condition of a perfect homogeneity of value and interest remains unfulﬁ lled. 
Constitutional law has undoubtedly shown itself to be capable, in spite of 
the fact that it shares in the key features of international law, of dealing 
with at least some of the normative disagreement and conﬂ ict of interest 
that Schmitt argues must prevent legitimate legal process, and of doing so 
in a way that is obviously preferable to Schmitt’s alternative of executive 
dictatorship. Moreover, if non-trivial domestic conﬂ ict is in principle 
amenable to the rule of law, the analogy of constitutional and international 
law should lead us to expect that non-trivial international conﬂ ict is also, 
in principle, open to settlement under binding legal rules. 
 The analogy of constitutional and international law, then, supports the 
project of international legalization. If legalization is desirable where it is 
feasible, and if the analogy between constitutional and international law 
implies that the problems of feasibility that afﬂ ict global legalism do not 
differ in kind from those that afﬂ ict domestic constitutionalism, we ought 
to give support to the project of fully subjecting international politics 
to the rule of international law. Not to do so would be incompatible with 
our commitment to domestic constitutionalism, to the goal of subjecting 
all domestic conﬂ ict to the rule of constitutional law. 79 To resist this 
conclusion, the modern sceptic about international legalization would 
have to embrace Schmitt’s view that constitutional and international law 
are equally incapable legitimately to resolve any non-trivial political 
conﬂ ict. He would have to deny the legitimacy of domestic constitutionalism 
along with the legitimacy of the rule of international law. 
 Of course, this argument invites the counter that Schmitt, for all his 
other faults, was quite right to read the analogy in the way he did. Though 
Goldsmith and Levinson, for instance, are careful not to draw very explicit 
normative conclusions from their claim that constitutional and international 
law are analogous, they do explicitly argue for a return to an Austinian 
perspective that regards both constitutional and international law as 
defective or non-paradigmatic forms of law, since neither is enforced by a 
meta-legal sovereign. 80 Goldsmith and Levinson agree that it is wrong to 
 79  This was Kelsen’s perspective on the analogy of constitutional and international law. See 
 L  Vinx ,  Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law. Legality and Legitimacy ( Oxford University Press , 
 Oxford ,  2007 )  176 – 207 ;  J  von Bernstorff ,  The Public International Law Theory of Hans 
Kelsen. Believing in Universal Law , translated by  T  Dunlap ( Cambridge University Press , 
 Cambridge ,  2010 ). 
 80  See Goldsmith and Levinson, ‘Law for States’ (n 2) 1796–800. 
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claim that international law compares unfavourably with domestic 
constitutional law, but this is so, they argue, only because both are forms 
of ‘public law’, i.e. of a political law that purports to constitute and to 
bind sovereignty. Such law, they suggest, will always lack the determinacy, 
enforceability, and democratic legitimacy of the legal commands that an 
already existing popular sovereign issues to his individual subordinates. 
The conventional view that international law is a defective form of law, 
then, is wrong only insofar as it fails to recognize that constitutional law 
is equally defective. Such a reading of the analogy, needless to say, lends 
itself to the attempt to justify executive claims to strong extralegal powers, 
and some inﬂ uential authors have in fact come to combine scepticism 
about international law with scepticism about constitutional law. 81 
 It would be uncharitable to suggest that contemporary attempts to read 
the analogy in an anti-constitutionalist key merely repeat the arguments of 
Schmitt’s that have been criticized above. Nevertheless, such attempts, 
much like Schmitt’s arguments, tend to move rather too quickly from 
the descriptive observation of the relative indeterminacy or the non-
enforceability of compliance to the normative conclusion that constitutional 
and international law should not be regarded as comprehensive or 
conclusive. 
 As I have argued above, it is not at all clear why legal determinacy 
should be regarded as a necessary condition of the legitimacy of legal 
conﬂ ict-resolution. To hold that legal conﬂ ict-resolution can only be 
legitimate if its outcome is completely determined by legislative or 
constitutional decisions already taken is just another way of denying that 
the law can ever legitimately arbitrate genuine conﬂ ict. However, if the 
law can never legitimately settle genuine conﬂ icts, social conﬂ ict will have 
to be settled in some other, purely political way. It should be evident that 
the observation that judges might have to deal with legal indeterminacy in 
hard cases does not answer the question whether that alternative is 
preferable to the rule of law. 
 The claim that compliance with ‘public law’ cannot be enforced by a 
sovereign able to keep all affected parties in awe of his irresistible power, 
though descriptively true, does not imply that constitutional or international 
law are inherently limited in their legitimate scope. After all, it is the very 
project of constitutionalism to create a legal order that does away with the 
need for a transcendent sovereign power. If modern public law was 
dependent on enforcement by a transcendent and potentially dominating 
sovereign power, then something would have gone wrong. Admittedly, a 
 81  See  EA  Posner and  A  Vermeule ,  The Executive Unbound: after the Madisonian Republic 
( Oxford University Press ,  New York ,  2010 ). 
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system of modern public law can only work if the affected groups, though 
lacking in perfect homogeneity, are willing to cooperate with one another 
in supporting the constitutional system, even where it creates outcomes 
they might not like. But experience shows that such cooperation is perfectly 
possible, and it would be perverse, given the goals of constitutionalism, 
to interpret the dependence of a system of public law on that attitude as 
a defect. 
 Finally, the argument of this paper will have made clear that 
constitutionalism, in its global and domestic form, is indeed incompatible 
with a certain conception of popular sovereignty. If a theory of popular 
sovereignty merely transfers the attributes of an absolutist sovereign 
to an imaginary constituent power, so that those who purport to speak 
for the latter can inherit the powers of an absolute sovereign not bound 
to the rule of law, constitutionalism will, of course, conﬂ ict with popular 
sovereignty. But it should be clear that popular sovereignty need not 
be understood in this way. Schmittian theories of popular sovereignty 
are normatively unattractive as well as conceptually confused, 82 and 
they are not our only theoretical option. The mainstream of democratic 
constitutional thought, stretching from Rousseau and Kant to Habermas, 
has always emphasized that popular sovereignty is internally related to 
the rule of law. 83 
 Kelsen and Lauterpacht had it right: It is perfectly possible to interpret 
the analogy between constitutional and international law in a constitutionalist 
key. The question is whether we want to do so, or whether we prefer to 
organize our political life around the distinction between friend and 
enemy. 
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